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Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of
Securities Fraud Regulations after United
States v. Vilar1
EDGARDO ROTMAN *
In August 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in the case of United States v. Vilar denied extraterritorial
application of the criminal law antifraud provisions contained in the Securities Exchange Act. The specific object of
this paper is to criticize this decision and negate its premises.
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After delving in depth into the notion of extraterritoriality,
the paper offers a dynamic interpretation of the 1922 Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Bowman, which
is still the governing precedent on extraterritorial application of criminal laws. Furthermore, the paper criticizes the
application of the 2010 Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank to criminal cases and explains the Dodd-Frank Act’s failed attempt to overrule it.
The paper undertakes a detailed analysis of each of United
States v. Vilar’s supporting arguments, using the German
criminal law model to identify some of this decision’s significant shortcomings. The paper begins with a discussion of
the extent and significance of the United States v. Bowman
exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality in
light of the need to protect the integrity of a delocalized capital market. Next, the paper interprets section 32(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act in accordance with modern developments of criminal law theory. Consequently, the paper analyzes the significant distinctions between criminal and civil
law in contrast with their equation by the Vilar court. The
discussion ultimately leads to a justification of the Securities
Exchange Act’s extraterritorial enforcement through a contextual and dynamic interpretation of section 32(a), taking
into consideration the transnational nature of market integrity and public wealth values protected by this provision.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
the case of United States v. Vilar denied extraterritorial application
of the criminal law antifraud provisions contained in the Securities
Exchange Act. The specific object of this paper is to criticize this
decision and negate its premises.
After delving in depth into the notion of extraterritoriality, the
paper offers a dynamic interpretation of the 1922 Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Bowman, which is still the governing
precedent on extraterritorial application of criminal laws. Furthermore, the paper criticizes the application of the 2010 Supreme
Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank to criminal
cases and explains the Dodd-Frank Act’s failed attempt to overrule
it.
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The paper undertakes a detailed analysis of each of United States
v. Vilar’s supporting arguments, using the German criminal law
model to identify some of this decision’s significant shortcomings.
The paper begins with a discussion of the extent and significance of
the United States v. Bowman exception to the presumption against
extraterritoriality in light of the need to protect the integrity of a delocalized capital market. Next, the paper interprets section 32(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act in accordance with modern developments of criminal law theory. Consequently, the paper analyzes the
significant distinctions between criminal and civil law in contrast
with their equation by the Vilar court. The discussion ultimately
leads to a justification of the Securities Exchange Act’s extraterritorial enforcement through a contextual and dynamic interpretation of
section 32(a), taking into consideration the transnational nature of
market integrity and public wealth values protected by this provision.
I. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL LAW IN THE PREVENTION AND
REPRESSION OF FINANCIAL FRAUD
A. Evolution of the Notion of Extraterritoriality
In the past, extraterritorial application of national criminal laws
was very limited. 2 Extraterritoriality grew with the emergence of
2

David Hume wrote that Scottish courts “are not instituted to administer
justice over the whole world, but in our country, or a particular district of it only.”
2 DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES
52 (1797), quoted in MICHAEL HIRST, JURISDICTION AND THE AMBIT OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 29 (Oxford U. Press 2003). John Austin considered extraterritorial applications of jurisdictional rules “anomalous cases” in THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 355 (Prometheus Books 2000), cited by GÜNTHER
HANDL, JOACHIM ZEKOLL & PEER ZUMBANSEN, BEYOND TERRITORIALITY:
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALISM 17 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2012). In MacLeod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales
[1891] AC 455, 458 (Austl.), the court asserted that “all crime is local” and “the
jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed.”
With respect to the United States, Cedric Ryngaert points out that “[t]hroughout
the history of US law, US courts have time and again pointed out the importance
of the territorial principle.” CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 59 (2d ed. 2008). In their contributions to a book on the harmonization of
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modern forms of globalization. 3 In the field of securities laws, the
comments to § 416 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
explain that “[a]s organized securities markets in different states are
increasingly connected through electronic and institutional links,”
territorial factors in the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction may become less relevant and extraterritorial factors more important. 4
In early English common law, a court could not hear a case if
any of what we currently call “elements of a crime” occurred outside
of England. 5 For example, in 1583, a murder committed on the foreshore came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the criminal admiralty court only “because it occurred on the seabed owned, by the
Crown under the Royal Prerogative . . . .” 6
In the United States, the notion of extraterritoriality experienced
dramatic changes since its early formulation in the 1824 Appollon
case. 7 According to this decision, a nation is entirely precluded from
extending its laws beyond its own borders, “except so far as regards
its own citizens.” 8
In the present era of globalization, the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction has been deemed inevitable. 9 “The expansion of commercial and financial interstate links has increased the vulnerability
criminal law, Mireille Delmas-Marty points out that the right to punish “is traditionally considered an emblem of national sovereignty,” and Mark Pieth expresses
that he was astonished that criminal law is developing into one of the driving
forces of harmonization of law “even though it was always considered a traditional stronghold of national sovereignty.” Mireille Delmas-Marty, Mark Pieth &
Ulrich Sieber, Les Chemins De L’Harmonisation Pénale Harmonising Criminal
Law, SOCIÉTÉ DE LEGISLATION COMPARÉE 19, 225 (2008).
3
For earlier historical precedents of globalization, see Edgardo Rotman, The
Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 38 (2000).
4
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 416 cmt. at 298 (1987).
5
Kenneth S. Gallant, What Exactly is “Extraterritorial Application” of a
Statute?, JURIST Forum (May 28, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271267.
6
Lacy’s Case (1583) 74 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B.), cited in RALPH J. GILLIS,
NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDES: SOURCES, APPLICATIONS, PARADIGMS 76 (2007).
7
The Appollon, 22 U.S. 9 Wheat. 362 (1824).
8
Id. at 370. This exception was confirmed by JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARDS TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES 22 (1834) (expressly stating
that every nation has a right to bind its own citizens by its own laws in every place
beyond its boundaries).
9
See RYNGAERT, supra note 2 at 187.
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of States to adverse domestic effects of foreign activities.” 10 In the
field of securities law, the extraterritorial reach of national law may
become necessary when some states set low standards to attract investors, refuse to criminalize certain fraudulent activities such as insider trading, or avoid stringent corporate governance regulations. 11
There is a certain parallel between the evolution of American
law and German law on the subject, especially in light of how these
laws’ extraterritorial reach expanded from the end of the nineteenth
century onwards.
To understand this evolution, I turn to a late nineteenth-century
classic text on extraterritoriality from Ernst Beling, one of the most
prestigious German scholars of that period. 12 In 1896, extraterritorial questions were limited to the legal status of governments, diplomats and their property, ships, and certain German representatives
abroad. 13 In sharp contrast, Peter Roegele’s 2014 book, significantly
titled German Criminal Law Imperialism, shows how German criminal law today applies extraterritorially in manifold ways. 14 Globalization of crime, the intensification of interstate relations, and the
need to protect transnational vital interests and values have determined the continuing expansion of German criminal law beyond its
national borders since 1871. 15
B. Extraterritoriality of Business-Related Criminal Law in a
Globalized Economy
Although criminal law, as “the most parochial of legal disciplines,” 16 has traditionally been a stronghold of territoriality, the
challenge of transnational business crimes in today’s interconnected
world requires the extraterritorial application of business-related
criminal laws as an indispensable condition of their effectiveness.
10

Id.
Id.
12
See generally ERNST BELING, DIE STRAFRECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG DER
EXTERRITORIALITÄT (1896).
13
See id.
14
See generally PETER ROEGELE, DEUTSCHER STRAFRECHTSIMPERIALISMUS:
EIN BEITRAG ZU DEN VÖLKERRECHTLICHEN GRENZEN EXTRATERRITORIALER
STRAFGEWALTAUSDEHNUNG (2014).
15
Id. at 2, 236.
16
Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 433, 433 (2006).
11
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Globalization of financial markets, advances in communications
and transportation technologies, decreasing relevance of national
borders, emergence of computer networks, reduced state authority,
increasing cyber finance and offshore banking, and high demand for
American securities abroad and vice versa, have increased the potential for transnational criminal securities fraud.
The extraterritorial application of national laws constitutes an
immediate response to such challenges. Other forms of internationalization of business-related criminal law that would presumably
eliminate safe havens and prevent securities fraud are: a) international treaties requiring an expanding number of nations to criminalize certain business crimes; b) preventive efforts by a number of
international financial institutions and standard-setting, and transgovernmental regulatory networks; 17 and c) “soft law” harmonization of national legislations eventually resulting in convergent national business-related criminal law systems.
C. The Pros and Cons of Extraterritorial Enforcement of BusinessRelated Criminal Law
An inquiry into the normative aspects of extraterritorial enforcement of geographically ambiguous statutes will facilitate the understanding of specific aspects of the Vilar decision.
The extraterritorial application of criminal law provisions governing securities fraud raises significant normative issues relating to
respect of the sovereignty of other nations and established principles
of international law, such as non-intervention, comity, and sovereign equality. 18 Also, such extraterritorial application may infringe
upon the domestic constitutional principle of separation of powers. 19
Moreover, from the viewpoint of democracy, extraterritorial jurisdiction may impose national laws on foreign legal subjects who did
not participate in their enactment. 20
17

See Stephen Kim Park, Guarding the Guardians: The Case for Regulating
State Owned Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 740–
56 (2014); see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 28–35 (2002).
18
RYNGAERT, supra note 2, at 188.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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However, as John C. Coffee, Jr. points out, curtailments of extraterritoriality, when not expressly mandated by statutory provisions, “miss much, and the unfashionable word—’extraterritorial’—
cannot be avoided.” 21 He mentions four basic reasons that weigh
heavily to support his conclusion: 1) the extreme mobility of major
financial institutions and their ability to park abroad their high-risk
operations, thus escaping the regulatory reach of their national legal
systems; 2) because major financial institutions are “too interconnected to fail,” regulation of systemic risk requires extending regulations beyond domestic financial institutions to their foreign counterparts as well; 3) the preference of some countries to keep “soft
law” standards “aspirational and ineffable” because they profit from
extremely risky unregulated havens; and 4) the assertion of extraterritorial authority by the major financial nations as the best way to
spur international bodies to develop a high consensus leading to
meaningful “soft law” standards. 22
Another set of normative arguments supporting the extraterritorial application of national statutes can be drawn from the customary
international law justifications of extraterritoriality, especially from
the protective principle. Transnational securities fraud may cause
serious damage to the integrity of financial markets, affecting vital
economic interests of a nation. Such territorial impact justifies the
extraterritorial reach of national laws under international law.
In addition, to support the extraterritoriality of securities fraudrelated criminal provisions, it is useful to draw from the area of competition law: the extraterritorial reach of national criminal sanctions
“enables states to protect their domestic market[s] from anti-competitive activities which, while taking place elsewhere, adversely affect the home jurisdiction.” 23 This basic argument can be applied by
analogy to the field of securities fraud. Also, here, extraterritoriality
adds a deterrent effect by addressing violations unchallenged by the
21

John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t
Come Home 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 236, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347556.
22
Id. at 4–5.
23
Ariel Ezrachi & Jiří Kindl, Cartels as Criminal? The Long Road from Unilateral Enforcement to International Consensus, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS:
CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 419, 424
(Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
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home jurisdiction due to lack of legislation or enforcement powers. 24 As in the case of competition law, “extraterritoriality of criminal sanctions [for securities law violations] may supplement administrative procedures in other jurisdictions.” 25
In the area of competition law, the extraterritorial reach of antitrust prohibitions makes a conceptual contribution to the public perception of the need for delivering markets from restrictive practices.
In this respect, the extraterritorial application of competition lawrelated criminal provisions has been praised for its export of “competition values.” 26 The extraterritorial application of securities
fraud-related criminal provisions may similarly contribute to global
consensus on a fair and efficient securities market. Furthermore, the
extraterritorial application of criminal law provisions to countries
operating in the global market force-feeds the criminalization
agenda to jurisdictions that resist extraterritoriality. 27
Austen L. Parrish advocates resolving global challenges through
multilateral agreements rather than through unilateral domestic action. 28 He recognizes, however, that “[e]xtraterritorial regulation is
not always a bad idea. In under-regulated areas, extraterritoriality
can sometimes fill a gap. And it may be that extraterritorial regulation can serve as a placeholder before more comprehensive international agreement can be reached.” 29
Also, the rigid application of the presumption against extraterritoriality ignores some positive effects created by the extraterritorial
application of United States law, such as “promot[ing] international
negotiation and cooperation.” 30 A similar, positive effect had been
noted in the extraterritorial application of anti-bribery laws, based
24

See id.
Id.
26
Id. at 425.
27
The idea of force-feeding is used in the field of competition law. See id.
28
Austen L. Parrish, Morrison, The Effects Test, and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality: A Reply to Professor Dodge, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. P ROC.
399, 401–02 (2011).
29
Id. at 402.
30
William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 163–68 (1998), cited
by William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 117 (1998) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Presumption Against Extraterritoriality].
25
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on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
on Combating Bribery of Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, by generating mechanisms that should help firms do
ethical business and comply with this type of legislation. 31
Sarah C. Kaczmarek and Abraham L. Newman carried out an
empirical study showing that extraterritorial application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act dramatically increases the likelihood that
foreign countries enforce their own anti-bribery norms. 32 Through
econometric analysis, Kaczmarek and Newman determined that “the
odds of a country enforcing its first [anti-corruption] case are twenty
times greater if a country has experienced extraterritorial application
of the [United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act].” 33 By the same
token, some pre-Morrison federal court decisions gave credit to the
extraterritorial application of United States antifraud provisions for
encouraging Americans to achieve a high standard of business ethics
in the securities industry. 34
On the negative side, the extraterritorial application of businessrelated criminal sanctions in one jurisdiction may undermine administrative or compliance programs in another. 35 Also, extraterritorial
application of this type of criminal norm may bring about a host of
double-jeopardy problems. 36
Mireille Delmas-Marty warns that a unilateral expansion of internal law under the guise of combating impunity risks becoming an
“internationalization of hegemonic type.” 37 Also, Stephen Kim Park
recognizes that the possibility of this unilateral extraterritorial reach
31

Branislav Hock, Intimations of Global Anti-Bribery Regime and the Effectiveness of Extraterritorial Enforcement: From Free-Riders to Protectionism? 9
(Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2014-009, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395156.
32
Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law:
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745, 760 (2011).
33
Id.
34
Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071,
1082 (2010).
35
Ezrachi & Kindl, supra note 23, at 425.
36
Id.
37
Mireille Delmas-Marty, Les Figures de L’Internationalisation en Droit Pénal des Affaires: Aplanir le Terrain de Jeu, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET
DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ, 735, 737 (2005).

2015]EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD 63

is “contingent on highly concentrated state power,” 38 and that” the
project[ion] [of a state’s] regulatory rules . . . depends on its status
as an economic hegemon.” 39
While recognizing the superiority of multilateral solutions, the
extraterritorial application of United States securities fraud-related
criminal norms cannot be dismissed merely because of their characterization as “hegemonic.” The immediate extraterritorial reach may
be indispensable not only to protect investors and punish unscrupulous manipulators, but ultimately to protect the integrity of financial
markets intimately related to the protection of public wealth. 40 For
instance, market integrity has a constitutional rank in Italy as a condition of the market economy. 41 In this regard, Salvatore Panagia
believes that Article 41, section 2, in combination with Article 47 of
the Italian Constitution, demonstrates that without criminal law protection of the integrity of financial markets against abuses and speculative excesses, these illegal abuses would not only destroy people’s savings, but also the private will to invest. 42
The most damaging effects of securities fraud, like those of other
business-related crimes, are that they create distrust toward the system and its healthy components. Sutherland underscores that the
most important damage resulting from white-collar crimes is the one
caused in social relations by destroying trust, depressing social morale, and producing disorganization. 43 Because public trust constitutes the vital sapping of international commerce, 44 an attack on it
by white-collar crimes poses a challenge that justifies the extraterritorial application of national criminal laws.

38

Park, supra note 17, at 754.
Id.
40
FEDERICO CONSULICH, LA GIUSTIZIA E IL MERCATO: MITI E REALTÀ DI UNA
TUTELA PENALE DELL’INVESTIMENTO MOBILIARE 405 (Dott. A. Giuffrè S.p.A.
ed., 2010).
41
SALVATORE PANAGIA, LA TUTELA PENALE DEI MERCATI FINANZIARI: LA
FATTISPECIE PENALE A RISCHIO DEFAULT 72 (G. Giappichelli ed. 2011).
42
Id.
43
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 13 (1967).
44
EDGARDO ROTMAN, LOS FRAUDES AL COMERCIO Y A LA INDUSTRIA 30
(1974).
39
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II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES V. VILAR’S FUNDAMENTAL
PRECEDENTS
A. United States v. Bowman
In United States v. Bowman, 45 the Supreme Court decided a
fraudulent fuel oil claim brought by a United States-owned corporation for one of its ships. The fraud consisted of purchasing 1,000
tons of fuel oil and delivering only 600 tons. 46 The money paid for
the undelivered 400 tons was then divided among four defendants. 47
Bowman—the ship’s engineer—and the master concocted the fraud
aboard the ship with the participation of two other co-conspirators
based in Rio de Janeiro. 48
In Bowman, the Supreme Court established that the presumption
against extraterritoriality does not apply to criminal statutes that are
not “logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud, wherever perpetrated . . . .” 49 Limiting the locus of some criminal offenses, the
Court explained, would greatly “curtail the scope and usefulness of
the statute and leave open a large immunity for fraud[]” committed
in a foreign country. 50 In other words, Bowman held that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not applicable when it undermines the statute’s purpose. 51
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank
In June 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 52 a case of obvious abuse of
American judicial resources by Australian plaintiffs through a foreign-cubed 53 securities fraud class action. As pointed out by Justice
45

260 U.S. 94 (1922).
Id. at 95.
47
Id. at 95–96.
48
Id. at 95.
49
Id. at 98.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 102.
52
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
53
Foreign-cubed is defined as cases where there is a foreign plaintiff suing a
foreign defendant for acts committed on foreign soil. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008).
46
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Stevens in his concurring opinion, the “case has Australia written all
over it.” 54
Morrison significantly limited the extraterritorial scope of the
antifraud provisions contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 55 and SEC Rule 10(b)(5), 56 finding that these provisions
do not create a private right of action for foreign purchasers of foreign securities outside the United States. 57 Prior to Morrison, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit required that the alleged
wrongful conduct had to have substantial effects in the United States
in connection with securities and transactions abroad (“effects test”)
or that sufficient fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States in
connection with securities transactions abroad (“conduct test”). 58 In
Morrison, the Supreme Court knocked down nearly forty years of
federal courts’ decisions, replacing their “conduct” and “effects”
tests with a new “transactional” test, limiting the scope of section
10(b) to causes of action that involve “only transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other securities.” 59 The Court applied a strict presumption against extraterritoriality when the “focus” of the relevant statute occurred outside
the territory of the United States. The Court concluded that the “focus” of the Exchange Act “is not on the place where the deception
originated, but on purchases and sales of securities in the United
States.” 60
C. Morrison’s Casualties
Morrison left investors unprotected in a number of situations.
As explained below, United States v. Vilar has compounded such
flaws by depriving victims of criminal law protection.
Some of these consequences are mentioned by Justice Stevens
in his concurring opinion in Morrison. He gives the imaginary example of an American investor buying shares of a foreign corporation that has a major American subsidiary with executives based in
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015).
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.
Morrison, 547 F.3d at 171.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
Id. at 266.
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New York City. 61 The executives mastermind a massive deception
inflating the corporation’s stock, which is only listed on an overseas
exchange, causing the price to plummet. 62 To this situation Justice
Stevens adds another imaginary one in which the same executives
persuade an unsophisticated retiree in Manhattan, on the basis of
material misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the company’s doomed securities. 63 Steinberg and Flannigan give a similar
example of “a retiree, after being sold a doomed security in a doorto-door sale by an executive of a foreign owned U.S. subsidiary,
might be barred from bringing a section 10(b) action.” 64
A group of forty-two professors provide a list of dismissals of
securities-fraud cases since Morrison, underscoring that this deficiency in investor protection would not have happened with a “conduct” and “effects” test because these tests captured the potential
complexity of the relationships among investors and issuers. 65
Among these cases, I highlight one of a Norwegian securities firm
and seven Norwegian municipalities that brought suit against various Citigroup entities. 66 This case concerned the sale of fund-linked
notes that were issued and traded outside the United States, but were
structured, arranged, and managed in the United States by
Citigroup’s New York subsidiaries. 67 Applying the conduct test, the
district court found that the essential core of the alleged fraud occurred in New York. 68 Six months later, after the Supreme Court
decided Morrison, the district court reversed its previous decision
and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because the fund-linked
notes were listed on European stock exchanges, notwithstanding the

61
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fact that the essential core of the alleged fraud occurred in New
York. 69
It is noteworthy that in transnational securities fraud cases covered in the past by circuit courts’ “conduct” and “effects” tests, in
both situations something happens in the United States, and therefore, Congress has an interest in them, and a presumption against
such interest is unfounded. 70 Precisely this circumstance is appropriately expressed in one of the earliest securities fraud Second Circuit decisions, where Judge Friendly pointed out “[t]he New Yorker
who is the object of fraudulent misrepresentations in New York is
as much injured if the securities are of a mine in Saskatchewan as in
Nevada” and “that Congress would have wished protection to be
withdrawn merely because the fraudulent promoter of the Saskatchewan mining securities took the buyer’s check back to Canada and
mailed the certificate from there.” 71 This is precisely one of the situations deprived from protection in Morrison. 72 Federal courts
adopted Judge Friendly’s position for four decades without congressional reaction, while Morrison’s interpretation lasted less than four
weeks until the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act attempted to reinstate both the “conduct” and the “effects” test for actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).
D. The United States Congress’ Failed Attempt to Overrule
Morrison
Morrison left ambiguous the SEC and DOJ’s authority to bring
extraterritorial actions under § 10(b). In July 2010, Congress addressed this issue in sections 929P(b) and 929Y of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; the most important financial reform legislation since 1934. 73 These norms grant
the SEC and DOJ jurisdiction over conduct within the United States
69
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that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even
if the securities transactions occur outside the United States and involve only foreign investors, or conduct occurring abroad that has a
foreseeable, substantial effect within the United States. 74 In other
words, Congress provided extraterritorial jurisdiction for SEC and
DOJ actions under § 10(b) by using a “conduct” and “effects” test
similar to the one used by the federal courts before Morrison.
Representative Paul Kanjorski, chairman of the committee that
drafted the Dodd-Frank Act sections 929P(b) and 929Y in Title IX,
in his floor statement, expressed that the purpose of the reform was
to grant authority to the SEC and DOJ to bring civil or criminal enforcement proceedings involving transnational securities fraud under both the “conduct” and the “effects” tests developed by the
courts regardless of the jurisdiction of the proceedings. 75 Addressing the very recent Supreme Court decision in Morrison, Representative Kanjorski reaffirmed that the bill’s provisions concerning
extraterritoriality are intended to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality “by clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department.” 76
Conversely, George T. Conway III, the lawyer who argued and
won the Morrison case for the defendant, concluded that section
929P(b) does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality
because the provision addresses only the “jurisdiction” of the “district courts of the United States” to hear cases involving extraterritorial elements. 77 Conway points out that the drafters of the DoddFrank Act ignored that in the Morrison decision the Supreme Court
reiterated the long-standing principle that the territorial scope of a
federal law does not present a question of jurisdiction, but rather a
question of substance. 78
74
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David He considers it unlikely that any lower court would interpret the statute in contradiction with Congress’s objectives “because
it is clear that Section 929P(b) intended to reinstate the conduct and
effects approach for civil and criminal enforcement actions brought
by the government against overseas violators . . . .” 79 In addition, He
cites Painter, 80 expressing that “[m]ost judges will not be willing to
tell Congress that, because of the way a statute is worded, it fails to
accomplish anything at all.” 81
If the SEC were free from Morrison’s jurisdictional limitations
in civil actions, as the Dodd-Frank Act intended, the SEC investigations and DOJ prosecutions of criminal violations of the Securities
Acts would unquestionably be free from the same restrictions. This
paper challenges the Vilar decision that extends the Morrison jurisdictional limitations to criminal cases. Vilar implicitly assumes that
the Dodd-Frank Act was ineffective. If the Dodd-Frank Act were
effective, Vilar would become irrelevant.
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. VILAR
A. United States v. Vilar
In United States v. Vilar, appellants Alberto Vilar and Gary Alan
Tanaka were convicted of securities fraud, securities investment
fraud, and conspiracy, and they were sentenced respectively to 108
and 60 months of imprisonment, required to pay $35 million in restitution, and ordered to forfeit $54 million.82 Exploiting their positions as prominent investment managers and advisors, Vilar and
Tanaka solicited millions with the promise of investing the funds in
predominantly safe, short-term deposits, but instead invested the
money in highly volatile technology and biotechnology stocks. 83
CO.& FIN. L. REV. 77, 79 (2011); Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act, 20 MINN. J. INTL L. 1 (2011).
79
David He, Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of U.S. Laws
after Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 148, 168 (2013).
80
Kaal & Painter, supra note 78, at 19.
81
He, supra note 79, at 169 n.69.
82
United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2nd Cir. 2013).
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The dot-com bubble burst of 2000 led to the precipitous fall of their
investment. 84 In the midst of the catastrophe, they obtained $5 million dollars from a client by deceiving her with the false promise of
an illusionary investment, while actually embezzling the entrusted
funds to meet various personal and corporate obligations. 85 In this
case, the Second Circuit held that securities fraud prohibitions section 10(b) 86 and Rule 10b-5 87 do not apply extraterritorially in criminal cases. 88 I will analyze the supportive reasons for this conclusion
step-by-step in the critical analysis below. The German criminal law
model plays a pivotal role in this analysis.
B. How a Comparative Analysis of the German Criminal Law
Model Can Help Identify Significant Shortcomings in United States
v. Vilar
The German model consists of a set of abstract criminal law categories adopted by most of continental Europe, Latin America, and
diverse parts of the world. This model is based on a comprehensive
and consistent methodology that “lends itself to application to any
system of criminal law regardless of its legislative foundations.” 89
Traditionally, German jurisprudence is regarded as a science
that shares the scientific status of the social and behavioral sciences. 90 Indeed, a prominent Spanish criminal law scholar considers
the German system of criminal law to be an achievement of the human sciences. 91
The use of a foreign model is justified by the paucity of categorizations existing within the common law to resolve issues presented
84
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by the Vilar case. This conceptual dearth is decried by a number of
American scholars. I will draw on the German model to develop my
critical analysis of Vilar and include references to American scholars’ complaints about insufficiencies of United States law in this
field.
C. Discussion of Each of United States v. Vilar’s Supporting
Arguments
In the following sections I will cite in bold characters the relevant parts of the Vilar decision, followed by my respective rebuttal.
1. FIRST CRITIQUE OF VILAR
“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies to
criminal statutes, and section 10(b) is no exception.” 92
a. The extent and significance of the Bowman exception
The Bowman decision excludes the presumption against extraterritoriality, as already explained, in criminal statutes that are not
logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction or fraud, wherever perpetrated.
Relying on some lower court decisions, the government claimed
in the Vilar case that Bowman excluded the presumption against extraterritoriality in all criminal law cases. 93 The Vilar court accurately rejected this incorrect interpretation. 94 Indeed, the Bowman
decision excludes the presumption against extraterritoriality only in
some cases. 95
However, the Vilar court grievously misinterprets Bowman by
excessively narrowing its exception to the point of making it inoperative. The Vilar court’s erroneous interpretation of Bowman consists of limiting the exception to self-defense from attacks against
government representatives or government property. 96 Indeed, the
Bowman exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality also
92
93
94
95
96
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applies to governmental functions and to the vital social interests
and goals served by the government.
To demonstrate the correctness of this argument, I will start with
a grammatical interpretation. According to the 1922 Bowman decision, a limitation of the locus of some crimes to the strictly territorial
jurisdiction would greatly “curtail the scope and usefulness of the
statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed” in foreign states as in the United States. 97 Furthermore, the decision refers only to criminal statutes “enacted because of the right
of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud
wherever perpetrated . . . .” 98
The Bowman exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality should not be limited to natural persons that represent the
government or to the government’s property, but should be extended
to the government’s functions as well as to its vital interests and
goals. In a democratic system, the government is a means to achieve
highly important social interests. This teleological interpretation is
also confirmed by the Bowman decision when it uses the word “obstructions.” 99 The word “obstructions” clearly refers to governmental functions. 100 This interpretation is also confirmed by the examples provided in the Bowman decision as cases in which “Congress
has not thought it necessary to make a specific provision in the law
that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but
allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.” 101 For instance, “bribing a United States officer of the civil, military or naval
service to violate his duty or to aid in committing a fraud on the
United States.” 102
It is also important that the Bowman decision was later used to
protect higher governmental interests, such as the environment and
the integrity of insolvency procedures. Consider the Skiriotes v.
Florida 103 decision. In this case, the Florida statute forbidding the
use of diving equipment for the purpose of taking commercial
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
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sponges from waters within Florida’s territorial limits was applied
extraterritorially on the basis that the United States is not limited by
any rule of international law from extending its laws extraterritorially to protect vital national interest such as natural resources. 104
This happens on the high seas and in foreign countries, provided that
the rights of another nation or its nationals are not infringed.
In Stegeman v. United States, 105 the Stegemans were convicted
of having transferred property from the state of Oregon to Canada
after filing a petition in bankruptcy, thus knowingly and fraudulently
concealing property belonging to the bankruptcy estate. 106 The court
considered that, as in Bowman, “Congress has not thought it necessary to make a specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred
from the nature of the offense.” 107 On this basis, the court considered
that Congress enacted section 18 U.S.C. § 152 to serve important
governmental interests and “not merely to protect individuals who
might be harmed by the prohibited conduct.” 108
Under the exceptions to the presumption against extraterritoriality, my interpretation of Bowman therefore encompasses the criminal law provisions protecting the integrity of capital markets. Because of today’s interconnectedness of capital markets through electronic and institutional links, the importance of their location plays
such a reduced role that one can no longer speak of “local” markets.
The globalization of capital markets requires a global system of investment protection; as long as this does not exist, the extraterritorial
application of American legal provisions remains necessary.
b. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Called into
Question
Another line of arguments questions the merit and value of the
presumption against extraterritoriality, which was challenged by
some scholars after the 2010 Morrison decision. In fact, these publications followed an article published in 2010 by John H. Knox in
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the American Journal of International Law. 109 Knox made a painstaking historical analysis of the presumption against extraterritoriality, showing its changing underlying rationale through time, and
pointing to its contradictions and incoherent application by the
United States federal courts. 110 Dissatisfied with these jurisprudential inconsistencies, he proposed a new interpretive canon—a presumption against “extrajurisdictionality,” the most predictable of the
possible options. 111
Knox looked into the bases of jurisdiction under international
law. In those cases where the United States has sole or primary jurisdiction, the courts are free to construe statutes without any presumption against their application. 112 When international law provides United States courts with only some basis of jurisdiction, the
courts should apply a soft presumption against the application of the
statute—that is, allow the courts to overcome it by indication of a
legislative intent to do so. 113 It is only when the United States entirely lacks any basis of jurisdiction under international law that a
strict presumption against application of the law should be overcome by only express and clear legislative statement. 114
In a subsequent 2011 article, 115 Knox addressed the Morrison
decision, rebutting its claim that the presumption against extraterritoriality provides “a stable background against which Congress can
legislate with predictable effects.” 116 He explained how Morrison
“exacerbated longstanding confusions in the Court’s treatment of
extraterritoriality” and noted that “virtues of a presumption against
extrajurisdictionality are illustrated by the very circuit court decisions that Morrison rejected.” 117 Knox renewed his proposal for a
presumption against extrajurisdictionality, underscoring the need to
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return to the roots of the presumption in the international law of legislative jurisdiction118 to bring the Supreme Court jurisprudence
back “into coherence and in better alignment with reasonable assumptions of congressional intent. . . .” 119
Knox pointed out that the Supreme Court showcased the presumption against extraterritoriality as predictable and stable; when
in the Supreme Court’s hands, however, the presumption was used
neither predictably nor stably. He underscored that the Court missed
the opportunity to resolve the ambiguity regarding extraterritorial
actions that affects the United States, compounding the confusion
by emphasizing the “focus” 120 of the statute in determining its extraterritorial reach. 121
More recently, Zachary D. Clopton challenges the validity and
meaningfulness of the presumption against extraterritoriality and
proposes to replace it altogether. 122 Clopton makes an inventory of
all the purported justifications of the presumption against extraterritoriality and concludes that none of them hold water. 123 These justifications from courts and scholars are based primarily on the need
to avoid foreign conflicts and Congress’ overriding concern with
domestic conditions. 124 To a lesser degree, other justifications include the need to affirm the principle of separation of powers by
avoiding judicial activism and the prevention of due process violations through extraterritorial suits. 125
Clopton analyzes in depth each of these purported justifications,
showing that they are weakened by contradictory judicial decisions
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and that these decisions reveal “the presumption is poorly attuned to
either of these laudable goals.” 126
It is significant for the purposes of my argument that Clopton
negates the absolute and immutable status of the presumption predicated by the Morrison decision, reminding us that the presumption
is a relative tool of federal statutory interpretation and not a constitutional principle. 127 In fact, Clopton indicates the possibility of replacing it altogether. 128
It is equally important that Clopton emphasizes that the rules regarding extraterritoriality should be different for civil, administrative, and criminal statutes. 129 It is disappointing, however, that Clopton’s proposed replacement for the presumption against extraterritoriality in criminal cases happens to be the rule of lenity, 130 a rule
of interpretation that, though important within its narrow ambit of
application, cannot be generalized to all cases of extraterritorial application of criminal law. The Supreme Court explains, “[t]he rule
of lenity applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid
can be derived,’ [a court] can make ‘no more than a guess as to what
Congress intended.’” 131 It is necessary to distinguish the external
geographical ambiguity of the field of application of a criminal statute from the intrinsic ambiguity relating to the prohibition and penalties contained in the definition of the criminal offense. Here, we
are not dealing with an intrinsic grievous ambiguity of a criminal
statute, but with a situation in which the extraterritorial purpose of
the statute, although implicit, is clear and obvious to a point that
makes it unnecessary to spell out.
The cases covered by the Bowman exception to the presumption
against extraterritoriality interpret statutory silence in situations
where the unexpressed statutory purpose is clear. 132 Without this
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provision, a misguided rule of lenity would eliminate all extraterritoriality of statutes that omit an express mention of their obvious
purpose of extraterritorial application across-the-board, including
the Bowman situation. Keeping the presumption against extraterritoriality limited by the exception introduced by United States v.
Bowman is a more adequate solution.
2. SECOND CRITIQUE OF VILAR
The Supreme Court has already interpreted Section 10(b), and it has done so in unmistakable
terms: ‘Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security
listed on an American stock exchange, and the
purchase or sale of any other security in the
United States.’ To permit the government to punish extraterritorial conduct when bringing criminal charges under Section 10(b) ‘would establish . . . the dangerous principle that judges can
give the same statutory text different meanings in
different cases.’ 133
Refusing to apply Morrison’s decision to the criminal enforcement of securities fraud is not giving a statutory text two different
meanings. Indeed, we speak about two different rules within the
same statute.
Section 10(b), 134 in itself, is no more than a private law prohibition. It is only when this behavior is carried out “willfully” that it
becomes part of the criminal law definition contained in section
32(a). 135 Section 32(a) is the proper criminal law norm. 136 It establishes a serious criminal penalty and the conditions that the conduct
has to meet in order to become criminal. 137
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The court in Vilar ignored that section 32(a) contains the definition of the crime, while section 10(b) generates only civil and administrative responsibilities, playing only a supplementary role
when it is incorporated by reference into a criminal law rule to complete section 32(a)’s definition. 138
Here, among other instances, the German criminal law model
provides an answer to an American legal question. In the present
case, the answer comes from the category of blanket criminal norms.
Incorporation by reference into a criminal norm has received considerable doctrinal development in countries belonging to the civil
law system. 139 The doctrine of blanket criminal laws (Blankettstrafgesetze, leyes penales en blanco, leggi penali in bianco) basically
consists of a special case of legislative drafting techniques that entail
the incorporation by reference of a norm existing elsewhere in the
legal system to complete a criminal provision. 140 Karl Binding
coined the word Blankettstrafgesetze (Blanket criminal laws) in his
trailblazing work, Die Normen und ihre Übertretung (Norms and
their Transgression). In the first volume of his 1922 five-volume
edition, he defined blanket criminal laws as those that contained
only the sanction and referenced a number of statutes and administrative or police regulations to complete the precept. 141 Until such
138
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secondary rules are enacted, the blanket law is “like a wandering
body searching for its soul.” 142 Further development of this doctrine
included in the category of blanket criminal laws the incorporation
by reference of provisions existing within the same statute. In 1931,
Edmund Mezger expanded the concept of blanket criminal law to
include situations where the same body of law contains the precept
in another section. 143 These cases are called improper blanket criminal laws and cover precisely the situation of the Securities Exchange Act. 144 This category plays a central role in business-related
criminal law, 145 where the application of blanket statutes is not only
frequent, but is also typical. 146 An example of the completion of a
blanket provision is § 3 of the German Law about business crimes
(WiStG) dealing with the regulation of prices, 147 as well as with
laws regulating wine (WeinG). 148 This theory perfectly applies to
the Securities Exchange Act, where section 32(a) is the blanket
criminal law norm that incorporates by reference section 10(b).
As a subsidiary argument, I underscore the relativity of the unitary principle invoked by the Vilar court; that is, both civil and criminal liabilities should be dealt with in the same way when they arise
from the same statute. 149 In addition, as Jonathan Siegel recognizes,
it is impossible to anticipate every possible circumstance in which a
canon of construction might someday apply. 150 “It is an error to believe that the process of statutory interpretation can ever be mechanized or reduced to a set of determinate, nondiscretionary rules.”151
Furthermore, in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, Circuit
Judge Lynch expressed in his concurring opinion that sometimes the
142
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same language in a statute should not necessarily be read the same
way in all contexts to which the language applies: “New content is
sometimes ascribed to statutory terms depending upon context.”152
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court explained that, depending on context, a statutory term might have different meanings
in different sections of a single statute. 153 Furthermore, Justice Stevens has repeatedly recognized that the same word can have different meanings in the same statute. 154
3. THIRD CRITIQUE OF VILAR
I will next address the third ground of the Vilar decision. The
government contended that section 10(b) had different requirements
in private law and criminal law; therefore, they should be interpreted
in a different way. 155 The “government observe[d] that only private
plaintiffs must prove reliance, economic loss, and loss causation,
whereas only the government (in criminal cases) must prove that the
fraud was committed willfully.” 156 Here is the Vilar response followed by my critique:
Critically, however, none of these differences relate to the conduct proscribed by Section
10(b) . . . . As for the element of willfulness in
criminal cases, it comes directly from Section 32
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which permits criminal liability to attach to a violation of
Section 10(b), only when the violation is willful.
But like the elements relevant only to private
plaintiffs, the requirement of proving willfulness
has nothing to do with the text or interpretation
of Section 10(b). In other words, Section 32 provides no basis for expanding the conduct for
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which a defendant may be held criminally liable
under Section 10(b). 157
This is another instance in which the contribution of the German
criminal law model is fundamental. We concede that the conduct
described in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 158 when
read in isolated from Section 32(a), 159 as a description of the external phase of a behavior, is the same for criminal and private law.
This external conduct corresponds in German law only to the objective phase of the definition. 160 The same external conduct, however,
gains full significance when it is incorporated into a criminal law
norm. 161 Criminalization operates as King Midas. In the same way
that everything King Midas touched became gold, criminalization
changes the nature of the behavior it addresses. While the traditional
understanding of United States common law is that conduct relevant
to criminal law is basically “a willed muscular contraction,” 162 this
naturalistic notion of human action has long been abandoned in the
majority of civil law countries. 163 Following the German criminal
157

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
159
15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012).
160
Modern developments in criminal law theory following the German model
structure the definition of the criminal offense in two phases: an objective and a
subjective. See, e.g. 1 ENRIQUE CURY URZÚA, DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL
278–79, 294 (Editorial Juridica De Chile, 2d ed. 1992).
161
When a certain behavior is criminalized, its statutory definition entails a
negative judgment value, technically called the “disvalue of the action.” See
HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 238–46 (Dunker & Humblot Berlin 1996).
162
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 269 (Oxford U.
Press 2007) [hereinafter GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW]; see also GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 44–46, 50–53 (Oxford U. Press
1998) [hereinafter BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW].
163
See definition of “civil law system” in footnote 139. Some examples of
scholarship from the numerous civil law countries where a naturalist notion of
conduct was overcome are from Peru, see JOSE HURTADO POZO, MANUAL DE
DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 381–394 (3d. ed. 2005); from Colombia, see
FERNANDO VELAZQUEZ V., DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 508–22 (4th ed.
2009); from Costa Rica, see GUSTAVO CHAN MORA & JAVIER LLOBET
RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO CASTILLO GONZALEZ Y EL DERCHO PENAL
COSTARRICENSE, cited in HOMENAGE AL PROF. FRANCISCO CASTILLO GONZALEZ
EN SUS 70 ANOS 38–39 (2014); from Argentina, see EUGENIO RAUL ZAFFARONI,
158
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law model, most of these countries have developed a more comprehensive and deeper concept of the nature of conduct in criminal law,
which is still evolving and undergoing scholarly inquiry. 164
Since the first half of the twentieth century, human conduct is no
longer regarded by most civil law system specialists as a simple
muscular contraction, but rather as an indivisible blend of objectivity and subjectivity. 165 After a long process of theoretical transformation, especially since the normative theory of culpability, 166 and
even more so since the goal-oriented theory of conduct 167 was formulated, intent and negligence are no longer considered forms of
TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL, VOLUME 3 97–134 (Ediar
1981); from Chile, see CURY URZÚA, supra note 160, at 249, 294; and from Spain,
see SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, INTRODUCCION A LAS BASES DEL DERECHO PENAL 221
(2d edition 2003).
164
CLAUSE ROXIN, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL, VOLUME 1 236–70
(Verlag C.H. Beck München 2006).
165
See BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 50–53; see
also HANS WELZEL, EL NUEVO SISTEMA DEL DERECHO PENAL 62 (1964). In Argentina, Professor Frías Caballero taught that the criminal offense is a set of interdependent elements “and that each element is a function of the other” and that
“each element has both an objective and a subjective aspect.” MARIANO CUNEO
LIBARONA, FRIAS CABALLERO: SU CATEDRA SOBRE LA TEORIA DEL DELITO, in
HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR DR. JORGE FRÍAS CABALLERO 139,141 (Colegio De
Abogados Del Departemento Judicial La Plata 1998).
166
The normative theory of culpability started with Reinhard Frank in 1907
(ÜBER DEN AUFBAU DES SCHULDBEGRIFFS (1907)) and was later developed by a
string of scholars. For this theory, culpability is basically blameworthiness. The
structure of culpability according to this theory is constituted by the following
three elements: capacity of being culpable (not being insane or an infant); intent
or negligence, which are the psychological links between actors and their conduct;
and the normality of the attendant circumstances. This means that in a concrete
situation, actors should have the power to act lawfully so that one can blame them
if they act wrongfully. In other words, the attendant circumstances must warrant
a fair expectation that actors behave in accordance with the law.
167
The theory of purposive action (teleological or goal-oriented action) was
conceived by Hans Welzel, who defined it as an activity consciously oriented towards a goal. This theory became the basis of the modern characterization of criminal offenses. The advocates of the teleological or goal-oriented theory of action
criticize the formulation of the normative theory of culpability mentioned in the
previous footnote. They claim that since the normative theory includes intent and
negligence as one of the elements composing the structure of culpability, it confuses the value judgment of culpability with the valued object (negligent or intentional action). Culpability therefore consists of a pure value judgment of blameworthiness, and intent and negligence are part of the conduct, which is the object
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culpability, but part of the subjective phase of the definition of the
criminal offense.
In addition to the correspondence of a particular conduct with
the definition of the criminal offense, both in its objective and subjective phases, such conduct must also be wrongful and culpable in
order to constitute a criminal offense. 168 A particular conduct is
wrongful when it contradicts legal norms protecting vital legal interests and values 169 that are significant enough to justify retributive
consequences instead of mere compensatory ones. 170 This is clear in
the Vilar case, where the possible punishment may reach a twentyyear sentence of imprisonment and criminal fines far exceeding the
extent of the damages. 171 Moreover, such wrongful conduct must
also be culpable in the sense that the perpetrator must be personally
blameworthy for the wrongful conduct. 172

of the value judgment. Therefore, intent and negligence are no longer elements in
the structure of culpability, but elements belonging to the definition of the criminal offense to which the conduct should adjust. The teleological or goal-oriented
theory of culpability revamps the structure of culpability, which is now composed
of three elements. The first element is the capacity of culpability; that is, the general capacity to understand the significance of one’s wrongdoing and to determine
oneself according to such understanding (e.g., infants and the insane are not capable of culpability). The second element is the possibility to understand the significance of one’s wrongdoing in a concrete situation. When actors not only lack
the actual consciousness of their wrongdoing, but also lack the possibility of attaining it, they cannot be blamed (cases of mistake about the legal prohibition).
The third element is the possibility to determine oneself in conformity with the
requirements of the legal order. In other words, it is necessary that attendant circumstances warrant a fair expectation that actors act in harmony with the legal
order to consider them blameworthy. In this respect, it is not fair to expect lawabiding behavior in situations of duress, concealment of close relatives from criminal persecution, and illegal superior orders. See generally H. WELZEL, DERECHO
PENAL ALEMAN, PARTE GENERAL (11th ed. 1970).
168
See JESCHECK & WEIGEND, supra note 161, at 218.
169
German criminal law considers the theory of Rechtsgut as the basic tenet
of criminal law. “Rechtsgut” can be translated as the vital interests and values of
the individual and society that are protected by criminal law.
170
See JESCHECK & WEIGEND, supra note 161, at 256–60.
171
United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95–97 (2nd Cir. 2013).
172
See WELZEL, supra note 167, at 197.
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Within the context of securities fraud, the specific word “willfully” contained in § 32(a) 173 means that the action externally described in §10(b) 174 must be committed with the consciousness of
its wrongfulness. 175 The Vilar court erroneously stated that “willfulness” has nothing to do with the text or the interpretation of
§10(b). 176 Quite the contrary, “willfully” indicates the specific subjective requirement needed for the structural transformation of the
conduct externally described in section 10(b) into the complex combination of external and internal elements that actually constitute a
particular criminal conduct. 177 To understand this transformative
role of the expression “willfulness,” one should of course connect it
with the high degree of wrongfulness of which the perpetrator
should be aware. 178 In this context, the subjective requirement of

173

15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
175
In the United States, the term “willfully” is surrounded with interpretive
confusion. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the word “willful” is a “word
of many meanings.” Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). In the context of securities fraud, however, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted this term correctly. The Ninth Circuit interpreted “willful” as “intentionally undertaking an act
that one knows to be wrongful.” United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188
(9th Cir. 2004). This decision is case-specific and in the United States, neither
courts nor scholars have categorized this concept within a comprehensive theory
of the criminal offense. “Willfulness” has neither been related to the conduct nor
to the values and interests protected by the criminalization of such conduct, as it
is the case in the German model.
176
See Vilar, 729 F.3d at 75–76.
177
See supra note 165.
178
See supra note 161. The term “willfulness” (see supra note 175) as defined
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tarallo, 380 F. 3d 1174, 1183 (2004),
links the intentionality with the high degree of wrongfulness needed to transform
the securities fraud into a criminal offense. The decision of Congress to make a
behavior criminal implies the requirement of a serious culpable wrongdoing; that
is, the willful conduct should contradict basic vital social values consisting in this
case in the integrity of the financial market as a crucial part of the economy. While
civil and administrative actions are available for the infringement of any rule under the Securities Exchange Act, only a limited number are subject to criminal
enforcement. For example, filing violations would be excluded from the latter. It
is necessary that the culpability of the perpetrator should be based on a degree of
wrongfulness enough to compromise the integrity of the financial market and to
thus arouse the moral condemnation of society.
174
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“willfulness” indicates a high degree of antisociality enough to justify the application of the criminal justice system. 179 To criminally
enforce a statute means that its infringement has attained such gravity that it deserves the moral condemnation of all society. 180
We have already used theoretical German legal approaches to
reformulate the notion of human conduct to challenge the Second
Circuit’s assumption that the notion of conduct is the same in both
civil and criminal contexts 181 and to interpret the nature and scope
of the word “willfully.”
The adverb “willfully” is given a pivotal role in section 32(a)’s
definition of the crime. 182 It corresponds in American terminology
to the mens rea of securities fraud. 183 As mentioned earlier, some
American scholars have noted insufficiencies in American law regarding this concept. These well-founded scholarly complaints justify the present article’s reliance on foreign legal systems in search
for conceptual clarification. Consider, for instance, Michael L. Seigel’s complaints. 184 Seigel denounces the massive confusion related
to the interpretation of the phrase mens rea 185 and undertakes a review of the multiple and conflicting interpretations of this key
phrase, which determines whether the actor has committed a crime
or not. 186
Seigel praises the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), published by the
American Law Institute in 1962, for unifying and simplifying the
common law’s mens rea terminology, and he recommends emphatically its adoption in the field of securities-related criminal offenses. 187 It is true that the MPC has improved and unified mens rea
179

See supra note 178.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 2 (5th ed. 2009).
181
United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2013).
182
15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012).
183
See Leng-Chia Hung, Securities Markets—A Place to Get Rich Quick or a
Quicksand Going Straight to Jail? The “Mens Rea” Required for Insider Trading
Criminal Liability, 5 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 2 (2010).
184
Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offences, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2006).
185
Id. at 1565.
186
See generally id.; see also Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The
Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21
(2001).
187
Model Penal Code § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
180
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terminology; however, it has not reached the conceptual depth
achieved by other legal systems since 1962. 188 A comparative perspective might provide American scholarship with the intellectual
instrument to better understand the role and significance of a particle
such as “willfully” within the context of a statute that criminalizes
behavior otherwise considered to be a mere civil or administrative
wrong. The need for such a contribution can be inferred from Joshua
Dressler’s insights into the ambiguity of the term mens rea. 189 Although apparently Professor Dressler is not aware of theoretical
criminal law developments in the civil law world, or at least he does
not refer to them, he intuitively understands some of the categories
elaborated in these countries. 190
Dressler has clearly perceived that the words “mens rea” hide
two different meanings: the “culpability” meaning and the “elemental” one. 191 According to the former, mens rea denotes a morally
blameworthy state of mind, while the latter indicates “the particular
mental state” elements included in the definition of certain criminal
offenses. 192 Such a perception has led to the reformulation of the
concept of criminal offense in countries that follow the German
model. 193
In German legal literature, which has influenced most civil law
countries in the last half of the twentieth century, the notions of “action,” “behavior,” and “conduct” are dealt with as inextricably
linked with intent, as opposed to older approaches in which human
beings were viewed as responsive machines. 194 The expression

188

Originally, culpability was conceived as a nexus or psychological link between the actor and the act. This link manifested itself in two forms: intent and
negligence. In the latest developments of criminal law theory, culpability became
a pure judgment of blameworthiness composed of three elements: capacity of culpability (i.e. sanity or age), the actual possibility of knowing the wrongfulness of
the action, and the ability to conform the action to the requirements of the law.
See WELZEL, supra note 167, at 214.
189
See DRESSLER, supra note 180, at 118–19.
190
See id.
191
See id.
192
See id.
193
Wolfgang Naucke, An Insider’s Perspective on the Significance of the German Criminal Theory’s General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts, BYU L. REV.
305 (1984); see also Dubber, supra note 90.
194
See GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 289.
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“willfulness” cannot be seen, as in the Vilar decision, as a mere appendage that triggers the intervention of the criminal justice system;
rather, it must be viewed as a crucial element in the definition of a
crime, transforming the nature and substance of the defined conduct.
In these new developments of criminal-law thought, human conduct
is no longer conceived as “a willed muscular contraction” but as
goal-oriented. 195 Intent, therefore, traditionally defined as a form of
culpability, becomes an essential component of the notion of conduct. 196 Culpability, on the contrary, is a judgment about such conduct that takes place at a later stage of analysis. 197 It consists of determining the personal blameworthiness of the perpetrator, taking
into account circumstances such as mental health, maturity, possibility of knowing the transgressed legal precept, and absence of duress. 198 Dressler, as explained above, has picked up on the ambiguity
of the word mens rea, used indifferently as a descriptive element of
a particular state of mind or as culpability in the general sense of
blameworthiness. 199 This is to a certain extent an approximation to
similar modern doctrinal developments in the civil law system. 200
The crime of securities fraud is actually defined in section 32(a),
in which “willfulness” is an essential element of this definition. For
the rest, it incorporates 10(b) by reference. 201 Accordingly, it is misleading to affirm, as Judge Cabranes does in Vilar, that the willful
commission of the fraud does not relate to the conduct prescribed by

195

Id. at 269; see BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 51–

53.
196

See CURY URZÚA, supra note 160, at 249, 294.
See WELZEL, supra note 167, at 214.
198
See id.
199
See DRESSLER, supra note 180.
200
In the modern civil law system developments, intent has been removed
from the notion of culpability and has become part of the notion of conduct and
therefore of the definition of the offense. Culpability, on the other hand, is a separate element of the criminal offense considered in the last stage of the crime’s
analysis consisting of a pure judgment of blameworthiness, as specified in note
188. Dressler understands that, on the one hand, the word mens rea means intent
as part of the definition of the offense, while, on the other hand, it refers to a
general judgment of blameworthiness.
201
15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012).
197

88

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:53

section 10(b). 202 Quite to the contrary, “willfully” is an essential element of the conduct, transmuting section 10(b) after its incorporation by reference to section 32(a). 203
The confusion of the court can be traced to the ambiguous nature
of mens rea in the Anglo-American tradition and how this ambiguity
“loops back and undermines our understanding of human action.”204
Judge Cabranes erroneously concludes that proving willfulness
has nothing to do with the text or interpretation of section 10(b). 205
He ignores that willfulness transforms the nature of the conduct. By
using such an expression, the Exchange Act refers to a particular
conduct that poses a social threat to the vital values and interests of
the community and becomes the object of moral condemnation of a
whole society. 206 This is, however, just the beginning of our argument. Any homicide, rape, or larceny is criminal conduct subject to
social condemnation and moral opprobrium, but the circumstances
in themselves do not justify their extraterritorial application. 207
Bowman expressly underscores that many intrinsically local crimes
fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the state and cannot be applied extraterritorially without an express mandate from Congress. 208
Further inquiry into the governmental and social value protected
by 32(a) combined with 10(b), that is, the integrity of the securities
market, leads us to conclude that such value is similar to those values protected by the Supreme Court in Bowman and used to affirm

202

United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2013).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78ff (2012).
204
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 288.
205
Vilar, 729 F.3d at 75–76.
206
See DRESSLER, supra note 180, at 118–19.
207
To justify their extraterritorial application without an express congressional mandate, it is necessary, using Chief Justice Taft’s words, that these “offen[s]es ‘are such that to limit their [prosecution] to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute.’”
CHEHTMAN,
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS
OF
ALEJANDRO
EXTRATERRITORIAL PUNISHMENT 76 (Oxford U. Press 2010) (internal citation
omitted).
208
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
203
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the will of Congress to apply the criminal provision extraterritorially. 209 The globalization of securities markets has brought about its
delocalization and, therefore, places it under the Bowman exception
to the presumption against extraterritoriality. 210
After having determined that “willfulness” transforms the nature
of the definition of fraud provided by section 10(b) into a criminal
offense, the next step is to determine that the social value protected
by such criminal provision rises to the nature of governmental interest that, according to Bowman, justifies its extraterritorial application. The Securities Exchange Act was basically enacted to protect
investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate
capital formation necessary to sustain economic growth. 211 The delocalization of securities markets requires the extraterritorial application of the Act to attain these goals.
4. FOURTH CRITIQUE OF VILAR
Here is Vilar’s last relevant proposition, followed by my critique:
The government argues that criminal statutes
‘are concerned with prohibiting individuals . . .
from defrauding American investors and from
using the infrastructure of American commerce
to defraud investors’ and that applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to criminal
statutes ‘would create a broad immunity for criminal conduct simply because the fraudulent
209

As for example, the environment in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69
(1941), and the integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding in Stegeman v. United
States, 400 U.S. 837 (1970).
210
See note 132; see also RYNGAERT, supra note 2, at 187.
211
“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor’s Advocate:
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct.
22, 2015). The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 mentions in Section 12 that
the purposes of the Act are the maintenance of fair and orderly markets and the
protection of investors and the public interest. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 112–158, § 12 (2012).

90

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:53

scheme culminates in a purchase or sale abroad.’
But much the same could be said of civil fraud
statutes: Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality immunizes thieves and swindlers
from civil liability for defrauding Americans
abroad. 212
To justify the application of Morrison to criminal cases, the Vilar court considers that the strict application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality has the same consequences in civil and
criminal realms. 213 If it were the same to dispense civil wrongdoers
from liability as to immunize perpetrators from criminal responsibility for a certain behavior, there would be no reason to criminalize
such behavior in the first place. There is a fundamental difference
between reduced protection of individuals against personal damages
and reduced protection of society against attacks to its vital social
interests and values, such as the integrity of financial markets. This
qualitative difference is reflected in the difference between civil and
criminal law procedures. Securities fraud can reach such gravity as
to concern not only the direct victim, but also the entire society.214
The award of compensatory damages results in a money transfer
from one person to another, while a criminal law conviction implies
the moral condemnation made by an entire society.
Business-related criminal law typically protects supra-individual vital interests and values, such as the integrity of securities markets. 215 In a globalized economy, these legally protected collective
interests have experienced such a delocalization that, to be meaningfully protected, they can hardly be constrained by strict territorial
limitations.
Another aspect of the distinction between civil and criminal law
that justifies its separate treatment regarding extraterritoriality is the
motivation and purposes of private litigants as opposed to those of

212

United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
213
See id.
214
See Edgardo Rotman, La Criminalidad Financiera en el Siglo XIX, 2
REVISTA DE DERECHO PENAL Y CRIMINOLOGIA 234 (1969).
215
TIEDEMANN, supra note 145, at 67.
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public prosecutors. 216 Morrison’s merit was to curtail the abusive
use of the American judicial system by Australian plaintiffs in an
intrinsically Australian case. 217 This case was an illustration of Lord
Denning’s remark: “[a]s a moth is attracted to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.” 218 Foreign litigants often elect the
United States forum, searching for handsome jury awards, punitive
damages, contingency fees, ample discovery, and other attractions
offered by American courts. 219 In private actions, profit considerations command the forum selection and eclipse any public policy
considerations. 220
A criminal action initiated by a public plaintiff, such as the Department of Justice, is unlikely to ignore potential international conflicts and will try to avoid them. The main reason supporting the
presumption against extraterritoriality is dispelled when a branch of
the United States government seriously concerned with avoiding international friction prosecutes the securities fraudsters. 221 This is the

216

“The enforcement for violation of federal securities law is carried out at
the administrative, civil and criminal levels. The SEC has the authority to initiate
investigations of potential violations and to prevent them through civil and administrative enforcement. The Department of Justice has sole jurisdiction over
criminal proceedings.” Christopher A. Yaeger, Securities Fraud, 51 AMER. CRIM.
L. REV. 1720 (2014). In addition, a federal district court in Pennsylvania
recognized a private right of action for violation of Rule 10b-5 in Kardon v. Nat’l
Gypsom Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The federal case law developed on
this subject was officially recognized by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe, Innocent
Abroad?: Morrison, Vilar, and the Extraterritorial Application of the Exchange
Act, 123 YALE L.J. 1875 (2014) (provides important insights on the difference of
securities fraud private and public actions).
217
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248
(2010).
218
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.) at
733 (Lord Denning, M.R.) (Eng.).
219
ANDREW BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION 20, 29, 31 (Oxford U. Press 2007); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3–5 (Wolters Kluwer 1996).
220
On the strong monetary incentives for aggrieved investors in private enforcement, see generally Nishal Ray Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private
Litigation in the Enforcement of Securities Laws in the United States, RAND
DISSERTATION SERIES 2007.
221
For a similar argument, see Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe, supra note 216.
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reason why the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to reintroduce the “conduct” and “effects” tests for public enforcement of the United States
law, whether by the SEC or the DOJ. 222
CONCLUSIONS
The Vilar decision incorrectly applies the Morrison holding to a
very different factual and legal setting. Morrison is about a private
law class action involving an evident abuse of the United States judicial system by Australian litigants. 223 This abuse led to a unanimous rejection by the district and circuit federal courts as well as by
the totality of the Supreme Court justices. 224 In contrast, Vilar is
about an action brought by the Department of Justice against transnational criminals to preserve social values of the highest rank, such
as financial market integrity and investors’ trust. 225 The severity of
the punishment, imprisonment of up to twenty years and significant
fines, demonstrates the gravity of the crime for which Vilar and his
accomplice were accused. 226 Unlike the National Australia Bank
agents in Morrison, Vilar and his accomplice were not trying to gain
U.S. jurisdiction, but rather were attempting to avoid it. 227
The Supreme Court’s Morrison decision is silent on whether its
interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act covers criminal prosecutions. 228 What’s more, Justice Stevens’s concurrence was in the
understanding that public enforcement of the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions was not included in the holding. 229
The Vilar court extended Morrison’s restrictive holding to the
criminal antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, disregarding essential substantive and procedural differences between the civil and

222

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203 (2010).
223
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 247 (2d
Cir. 2008).
224
See generally id.; see also Morrison, 547 F.3d at 172 (2d Cir. 2008).
225
See generally United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013).
226
See generally id.
227
See generally Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247; Vilar, 729 at 62.
228
See generally Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247.
229
See id. at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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criminal law ambits. 230 The Court further ignored the dynamic character and the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act in a world of
internationalized financial markets. 231
Despite its wholehearted adherence to Morrison’s interpretation
of the Act, Vilar recognized that United States v. Bowman had survived Morrison. 232 Such recognition opens a significant crack in the
presumption against extraterritoriality, a seemingly iron wall in Justice Scalia’s own statutory interpretative methodology.
After undermining the presumption against extraterritoriality by
recognizing the validity of the Bowman exception, Vilar tried to
backtrack by giving the narrowest possible interpretation of Bowman. 233 This artificial conclusion betrays not only Bowman’s words,
but also its spirit.
It is important to bear in mind that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a constitutional principle; it is a canon of interpretation with dubious precedential value. 234 This is a case in
which Morrison’s supportive rationale should not be binding, and
its interpretative methodology should not be adopted—all the more
so, as in this case, when they are applied to new and different factual
contexts.
Statutory interpretative methodology is not part of the holding.
“[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis a case is important only for
what it decides—for the ‘what,’ not for the ‘why,’ and not for the
‘how.’” 235 In this respect, Randy J. Kozel warns against precedents
defined “capaciously and inclusively in constraining future courts,”
as is often the case in contemporary federal practice. 236 Morrison is
an example of this unwarranted broadening of the holding’s scope.
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Scalia himself believes that dicta are “binding upon neither” the
Supreme Court nor the inferior courts, and that they do not deserve
stare decisis weight. 237 Moreover, as Judge Leval pointed out, “[t]he
Supreme Court’s dicta are not law,” and judges “may not treat Supreme Court’s dictum as dispositive.” 238 Although Scalia emphasizes that the presumption against extraterritoriality has historical
lineage, 239 such circumstance does not prove binding force. 240
Furthermore, sections 10(b) and 32(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act should be interpreted systematically and in accordance
with the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act. 241 The definition
of the crime prosecuted in United States v. Vilar is contained in section 32(a). 242 As a blanket provision, this section incorporates by
reference section 10(b), which provides the external description of
the criminalized behavior. 243 Moreover, section 32(a) criminalizes
securities fraud by punishing it with a severity commensurate to the
values protected by such criminal provision. 244
The term “willfully” in section 32(a) is inextricably related to
the conduct externally described in section 10(b) and incorporated
by reference into the criminal provision of section 32(a). 245 The law
requires a specific state of mind when securities frauds have reached
the magnitude that justifies their criminalization (that is, threatening
both market integrity and public wealth). 246 The protection of these
vital social values that are instrumental to the workings of the economy led the legislator to create a new criminal provision. This provision includes the more stringent requirement of consciousness of
a type of wrongfulness, the magnitude of which explains such criminalization. Perpetrators must be aware of the contradiction of their
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behavior with vital social values to an extent that justifies their criminal law protection under section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act. 247
Therefore, in the context of securities frauds, the adverb “willfully” stands for a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
made unlawful by section 10b of the Exchange Act, carried out with
the awareness of its inherent highly detrimental nature. The magnitude of the action’s harmfulness should be measured against its aptitude to compromise the integrity of the financial market, thus
reaching the point that had led Congress to criminalize it in the first
place. 248 “Willfully,” therefore, is not a mere appendage disconnected from the conduct externally described by section 10(b), as
Vilar shortsightedly believes.
Moreover, it is precisely the transnational nature of the values of
market integrity and public wealth protected by section 32(a) that
justifies the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange
Act antifraud provisions. The globalization of financial markets regulated by the Securities Exchange Act demands a dynamic interpretation of the Act, in light of its “present societal, political, and legal
context.” 249
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